Emmanuel NarteyCorresponding author

Omniscience, Free Will, and Religious Belief

Article
21/2 - Fall 2016, pages 135-155
Date of online publication: 31 juillet 2017
Date of publication: 30 décembre 2016

Abstract

In this paper I examine a standard foreknowledge argument and some interesting ways of handling it, along with some criticisms. I argue that there are philosophically interesting notions of free will that are compatible with determinism. These are the notions of free will that matter to ordinary life, and I argue that these generate a way for a philosophically interesting understanding of free will to be compatible with belief in God’s infallible foreknowledge. I discuss two key questions—the empirical question and the divine interference question—that are often neglected in the contemporary debate on foreknowledge and free will. Finally, I provide some answers to these questions that I hope can advance the debate.

Cite this article

Nartey, Emmanuel. “Omniscience, Free Will, and Religious Belief.” Forum Philosophicum 21, no. 2 (2016): 135–55. doi:10.35765/forphil.2016.2102.09.