https://fp.waik.stronazen.pl:443//4776-2016-2-01.html In this paper I examine a standard foreknowledge argument and some interesting ways of handling it, along with some criticisms. I argue that there are philosophically interesting notions of free will that are compatible with determinism. These are the notions of free will that matter to ordinary life, and I argue that these generate a way for a philosophically interesting understanding of free will to be compatible with belief in God’s infallible foreknowledge. I discuss two key questions—the empirical question and the divine interference question—that are often neglected in the contemporary debate on foreknowledge and free will. Finally, I provide some answers to these questions that I hope can advance the debate. Issues 21/2 - Fall 2016 Articles fr Tue, 05 Jan 2021 16:06:21 +0100 Tue, 05 Jan 2021 16:06:21 +0100 https://fp.waik.stronazen.pl:443//4776-2016-2-01.html 0