https://fp.waik.stronazen.pl:443//index.html?id=451 Index des publications de Authors Józef Bremer fr 0 https://fp.waik.stronazen.pl:443//4794-2201-05.html This paper discusses the issues surrounding voluntary action control in terms of two models that have emerged in empirical research into how our human conscious capabilities govern and control voluntary motor actions. A characterization of two aspects of consciousness, phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness, enables us to ask whether effect anticipations need be accessible to consciousness, or whether they can also have an effect on conscious control at an unconscious stage. A review of empirical studies points to the fact that willed actions are influenced by effect anticipations both when they are conscious and when they remain inaccessible to the conscious mind. This suggests that the effects of conscious voluntary actions—in line with the ideomotor principle proposed by William James—are anticipated during the generation of responses. I propose that the integration of perceptual and motor codes arises during action planning. The features of anticipated effects appear to be optionally connected with the features of the actions selected to bring about these effects in the world. Tue, 05 Jan 2021 16:10:45 +0100 Tue, 05 Jan 2021 16:10:45 +0100 https://fp.waik.stronazen.pl:443//4794-2201-05.html https://fp.waik.stronazen.pl:443//4788-2201-01.html The goal of the review is the presentation of some aspects of brain anatomy and neurophysiology important for consciousness, which hopefully may be of some advantage for philosophers of conscious mind. Comming from the distinction between “the hard problem” and “the weak problems” of consciousness we will concentrate on the questions dedicated to the second one. A putative “consciousness system” in brain will be presented paying special attention on diffuse projection systems. The “center of gravity” will be placed on brain connectivity, since consciousness MUST critically be dependent on coherent activity and timing, and hence on functional integrity and properties of the network of nerve fibers, i.e. connectivity. “Detectors” of synchronicity and coincidence, like NMDA receptors must also play role. To be conscious we do not need entire brain. In contrary to even large hemispherectomy, not unequivocally affecting consciousness, incomparably smaller lesions in the brain stem may be devastating in this regard. Recently M. F. Glasser et al. managed to “parcel” human brain cortex into distinguished 180 separate areas. Though the precise function of most of these areas is unknown, surely (one may assume) this structural pattern of brain has not been developed for nothing! But for what, or why? We are not going here to answer e.g. the question if conscious mind has some influence on the functions of the brain. Tue, 05 Jan 2021 16:10:16 +0100 Fri, 05 Feb 2021 00:58:20 +0100 https://fp.waik.stronazen.pl:443//4788-2201-01.html https://fp.waik.stronazen.pl:443//4737-2015-1-06.html In cases where one sense-modality is stimulated by another, we speak of synesthesia, i.e., of a subjective experience of multiple distinct sensations as being quite literally conjoined. The term “synesthesia” is derived indirectly from the Greek words “syn,” meaning “together,” and “aisthesis,” meaning “sensation.” This article focuses on the question of whether synesthesia is in fact a mental disorder or a creative gift. Both the commonsense views that have emerged in recent times, and neurological research, demonstrate that our knowledge of this relatively uncommon phenomenon is slowly but constantly expanding. Proper experimental research conducted with the right sorts of synesthete, and philosophically and scientifically nuanced conceptual studies of synesthesia, can all be helpful when seeking answers to the question posed above, while also confirming general claims about the extent to which our perceptions are really subjective. Most synesthetes see themselves as gifted, and claim that this “conjoining of the senses” enriches the quality of their lives. Tue, 05 Jan 2021 15:38:12 +0100 Tue, 05 Jan 2021 15:38:12 +0100 https://fp.waik.stronazen.pl:443//4737-2015-1-06.html https://fp.waik.stronazen.pl:443//4655-17-2-fall-2012-07.html The article reviews the book Mind and Cosmos: Why the Materialist Neo-Darwinian Conception of Nature Is Almost Certainly False, by Thomas Nagel. Tue, 05 Jan 2021 11:27:54 +0100 Tue, 05 Jan 2021 11:27:54 +0100 https://fp.waik.stronazen.pl:443//4655-17-2-fall-2012-07.html https://fp.waik.stronazen.pl:443//4631-17-1-spring-2012-06.html The article reviews the book Das Vorschreiten der Säkularisierung. Erweiterte Neuausgabe [The Progression of Secularization], by Hans Werhahn. Tue, 05 Jan 2021 11:02:19 +0100 Tue, 05 Jan 2021 11:02:19 +0100 https://fp.waik.stronazen.pl:443//4631-17-1-spring-2012-06.html https://fp.waik.stronazen.pl:443//4593-16-1-spring-2011-06.html According Aristotle's On the Soul, the first and most important form of sensation which we human beings share with other animals is a sense of touch. Without touch animals cannot exist. The first part of my article presents Aristotle's teaching about the internal connection between the soul and the sensory powers, especially as regards the sense of touch. The second part consists of a collection of the classical considerations about this subject. The third part then deals with the actuality of some Aristotle's thesis about touch with reference to current research in neurophysiology on kinesthesia and haptic perception. Fri, 18 Dec 2020 14:09:22 +0100 Fri, 18 Dec 2020 14:09:22 +0100 https://fp.waik.stronazen.pl:443//4593-16-1-spring-2011-06.html https://fp.waik.stronazen.pl:443//4419-13-1-spring-2008-13.html The article reviews the book Śmierć, nieśmiertelność, sens życia. Egzystencjalny wymiar filozofii Ludwiga Wittgensteina [Death, Immortality, the Meaning of Life: The Existential Dimension of Ludwig Wittgenstein's Philosophy], by Ireneusz Ziemiński. Thu, 17 Dec 2020 14:22:33 +0100 Thu, 17 Dec 2020 14:22:33 +0100 https://fp.waik.stronazen.pl:443//4419-13-1-spring-2008-13.html https://fp.waik.stronazen.pl:443//4323-11-2006-29.html The article reviews the book Religiöse Erfahrung zwischen Emotion und Kognition: William James’ Karl Girgensohns, Rudolf Otto und Carl Gustav Jungs Psychologie des religiösen Erlebens [Religious Experience between Emotion and Cognition: William James, Karl Girgensohns, Rudolf Otto and Carl Gustav Jung on the Psychology of Religious Experience], by Henryk Machoń. Tue, 15 Dec 2020 10:47:08 +0100 Tue, 15 Dec 2020 10:47:08 +0100 https://fp.waik.stronazen.pl:443//4323-11-2006-29.html https://fp.waik.stronazen.pl:443//4308-11-2006-22.html The article reviews the book Byt i sens. Księga Pamiątkowa VII Polskiego Zjazdu Filozoficznego w Szczecinie, 14–18 września 2004 roku, edited by Renata Ziemińska and Ireneusz Ziemiński. Tue, 15 Dec 2020 10:39:29 +0100 Tue, 15 Dec 2020 10:39:29 +0100 https://fp.waik.stronazen.pl:443//4308-11-2006-22.html https://fp.waik.stronazen.pl:443//4227-10-2005-14.html Znane z Traktatu wypowiedzi na temat „Ja" i „świata": „świat jest moim światem" (TLP 5.62), „Sam jestem swoim światem" (5.63), czy tez „Świat i życie to jedno" (5.621), są istotne dla zrozumienia kwestii solipsyzmu, omawianych przez „wczesnego" Wittgensteina. Pod „solipsyzm" rozumie się zazwyczaj krańcową formę subiektywnego idealizmu głoszącego, że istnieje tylko Ja sam, a wszystko inne jest moim wyobrażeniem. Solipsysta uznaje, ze jego własna subiektywność jest czymś jedynie możliwym do poznania, co oznacza doprowadzenie idealizmu do subiektywnej skrajności: wszystko co nam się ukazuje, jest traktowane jako coś wyobrażonego. Pytanie o solipsyzm pojawia się w dzisiejszych analizach subiektywności świadomości. Solipsysta neguje chociażby możliwość ustalenia, czy jakiś inny podmiot (człowiek, zwierzę lub maszyna) są siebie świadome. Rzeczywistość obcych stanów świadomości jest przez solipsysta ignorowana, gdyż wychodząc z istnienia własnej świadomości, może on jedynie przez analogię wnioskować o istnieniu obcych stanów świadomości. W argumentacjach przeciwko solipsyzmowi podkreśla się, ze stanowisko to wikła się w sprzeczność, gdyż w celu sformułowania swoich własnych też musi używać języka, co z kolei zakłada obecność intersubiektywnego świata, którego istnienie neguje. Fri, 11 Dec 2020 12:31:26 +0100 Fri, 11 Dec 2020 12:31:26 +0100 https://fp.waik.stronazen.pl:443//4227-10-2005-14.html