https://fp.waik.stronazen.pl:443//4339-12-1-spring-2007-07.html If we consider certain features of Spinoza's metaphysics, it can seem very difficult to see how error, or the having of false ideas, is possible. In this paper I want to give the metaphysical background to the problem, before turning to a more detailed consideration of how Spinoza in fact accounts for error, or the having of false ideas. I will show the importance of the notions of adequacy and inadequacy in Spinoza's account. Having done this I will return to the central problem of accounting for the ontological status of false ideas vis a vis both the Infinite Intellect, and finite minds. Issues 12/1 - Spring 2007 Articles fr Wed, 16 Dec 2020 12:23:46 +0100 Wed, 16 Dec 2020 12:23:46 +0100 https://fp.waik.stronazen.pl:443//4339-12-1-spring-2007-07.html 0