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    <title>Authors : Emmanuel Nartey</title>    
    <link>https://fp.waik.stronazen.pl:443//index.html?id=3108</link>
    <description>Index des publications de Authors Emmanuel Nartey</description>
    <language>fr</language>    
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      <title>Omniscience, Free Will, and Religious Belief</title>  
      <link>https://fp.waik.stronazen.pl:443//4776-2016-2-01.html</link>
      <description>In this paper I examine a standard foreknowledge argument and some interesting ways of handling it, along with some criticisms. I argue that there are philosophically interesting notions of free will that are compatible with determinism. These are the notions of free will that matter to ordinary life, and I argue that these generate a way for a philosophically interesting understanding of free will to be compatible with belief in God’s infallible foreknowledge. I discuss two key questions—the empirical question and the divine interference question—that are often neglected in the contemporary debate on foreknowledge and free will. Finally, I provide some answers to these questions that I hope can advance the debate. </description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 05 Jan 2021 16:06:21 +0100</pubDate>
      <lastBuildDate>Tue, 05 Jan 2021 16:06:21 +0100</lastBuildDate>      
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