https://fp.waik.stronazen.pl:443//index.html?id=179 Index des publications de Authors Carl Humphries fr 0 https://fp.waik.stronazen.pl:443//4786-2016-2-06.html This article reviews the book Selected Issues in the History of Polish Philosophy (Erasmus Lectures at Vilnius University), by Tomasz Mróz. Tue, 05 Jan 2021 16:07:58 +0100 Tue, 05 Jan 2021 16:07:58 +0100 https://fp.waik.stronazen.pl:443//4786-2016-2-06.html https://fp.waik.stronazen.pl:443//4778-2016-2-02.html This article explores the clarificatory potential of a specific way of approaching philosophical problems, centred on the analysis of the ways in which philosophers treat the relationship between ontological and historical forms of commitment. Its distinctive feature is a refusal to begin from any premises that might be considered ‘ontologistic’ or ‘historicistic’. Instead, the relative status of the two forms of commitment is left open, to emerge in the light of more specific inquiries themselves. In this case the topic in question is furnished by an essay from the early 20th century German philosopher Herman Schmalenbach, entitled Der Genealogie der Einsamkeit (somewhat problematically translated as “On Lonesomeness”). The aim is to show how the import of Schmalenbach’s historico-philosophical treatment of certain features arguably central to the spiritual practices and religious beliefs of Christianity can be more effectively grasped when approached in these terms. The first part provides an overview of the key points of Schmalenbach’s essay, while the second presents some conceptual-analytic considerations as a basis for exploring relations between ontological and historical forms of commitment as these figure in his text. Some possible broader implications for Christianity and its relationship to modern society are then also briefly sketched. Tue, 05 Jan 2021 16:07:11 +0100 Tue, 05 Jan 2021 16:07:11 +0100 https://fp.waik.stronazen.pl:443//4778-2016-2-02.html https://fp.waik.stronazen.pl:443//4693-18-2-fall-2013-09.html In his newly reissued and revised book, the philosopher Ian Dearden at- tempts a critical inquiry into a philosophical position he calls “nonsensi- calism,” which he takes to correspond to the view “that it is possible to be mistaken in thinking one means anything by what one says” (9).1 He holds that an unexamined assumption to this effect is implicit in a large swathe of philosophical work dating from a period stretching throughout most of the 20th century (and to some degree extending to the present day), thanks to the widespread tendency of philosophers to accuse each other of talk- ing nonsense. This is, according to the author of the book, most visible in the earlier and later philosophical writings of Wittgenstein, in logical pos- itivism, and in representatives of the Oxford-based “ordinary language” philosophy movement, as well as in the writings of many of those subse- quently writing under the influence of these. Dearden coins a special term to refer to the sort of error that philosophers are accusing each other of having committed: he calls such cases of error “illusions of meaning.” Tue, 05 Jan 2021 15:03:25 +0100 Tue, 05 Jan 2021 15:03:25 +0100 https://fp.waik.stronazen.pl:443//4693-18-2-fall-2013-09.html