https://fp.waik.stronazen.pl:443//index.html?id=1743 Index de responsibility fr 0 https://fp.waik.stronazen.pl:443//3567-2402-11.html The idea of artificial intelligence implies the existence of a form of intelligence that is “natural,” or at least not artificial. The problem is that intelligence, whether “natural” or “artificial,” is not well defined: it is hard to say what, exactly, is or constitutes intelligence. This difficulty makes it impossible to measure human intelligence against artificial intelligence on a unique scale. It does not, however, prevent us from comparing them; rather, it changes the sense and meaning of such comparisons. Comparing artificial intelligence with human intelligence could allow us to understand both forms better. This paper thus aims to compare and distinguish these two forms of intelligence, focusing on three issues: forms of embodiment, autonomy and judgment. Doing so, I argue, should enable us to have a better view of the promises and limitations of present-day artificial intelligence, along with its benefits and dangers and the place we should make for it in our culture and society. Thu, 19 Dec 2019 17:43:00 +0100 Fri, 20 Dec 2019 16:36:28 +0100 https://fp.waik.stronazen.pl:443//3567-2402-11.html https://fp.waik.stronazen.pl:443//3288-who-is-the-other.html This paper deals with the problem of what otherness consists in, and what its foundation is, within the I–Other relation. In this way, the study also explores the limits of ethics and of a quasi-religious attitude, in order to establish what is required to shape interpersonal relations in a non-violent way, when faced with the radical otherness of another human being. Such an investigation also intersects with a broader ethical discussion that aims to take account of glorious or heroic acts, focused on the issue of supererogation. The aim of the present study is to demonstrate the degree to which a neglect of reciprocity and justice in the context of such philosophical research constitutes a risky step. To this end, the main aspects of the debate between Emmanuel Levinas and Paul Ricœur are introduced. After examining the position of Levinas, and how Ricœur interprets the I–Other relation in Levinas, an attempt is made to assess whether the latter’s line of criticism is pertinent and helpful for attempts to arrive at the core of the disagreement between the two thinkers. Wed, 24 Oct 2018 19:20:34 +0200 Tue, 02 Apr 2019 12:47:49 +0200 https://fp.waik.stronazen.pl:443//3288-who-is-the-other.html