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    <title>Authors : Simin Rahimi</title>    
    <link>https://fp.waik.stronazen.pl:443//index.html?id=1284</link>
    <description>Index des publications de Authors Simin Rahimi</description>
    <language>fr</language>    
    <ttl>0</ttl>
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      <title>Divine Command Theory in the Passage of History</title>  
      <link>https://fp.waik.stronazen.pl:443//4503-14-2-fall-2009-08.html</link>
      <description>Are actions that are morally good, morally goosd because God makes them so (e.g., by commanding them)? Or does God urge humans to do them because they are morally good anyway? What is, in general, the relationship between divine commands and ethical duties? It is not an uncommon belief among theists that morality depends entirely on the will or commands of God: all moral facts consist exclusively in facts about his will or commands. Thus, not only is an action right because it is commanded by God, but its conformity to his commands is what alone makes it right. An action is right (wrong) solely because he commands (forbids) it, and solely in virtue of his doing so. This view has come to be known as the „divine command theory of morality&quot;. This paper is devoted to a brief reconstruction of claims and controversies surrounding the theory, beginning with Plato's Euthyphro, which is the historical initiator of the debate and to a reconstruction of the various lines of argument that have been set forth to defend the theory. </description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 18 Dec 2020 12:29:36 +0100</pubDate>
      <lastBuildDate>Fri, 18 Dec 2020 12:29:36 +0100</lastBuildDate>      
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      <title>Swinburne on the Euthyphro Dilemma</title>  
      <link>https://fp.waik.stronazen.pl:443//4397-13-1-spring-2008-02.html</link>
      <description>Modern philosophers normally either reject the „divine command theory” of ethics and argue that moral duties are independent of any commands, or make it dependent on God's commands but like Robert Adams modify their theory and identify moral duties in terms of the commands of a loving God. Adams regards this theory as metaphysically necessary. That is, if it is true, it is true in all possible worlds. But Swinburne's (1981) position is unprecedented insofar as he regards moral truths as analytically necessary. In this paper Swinburne's argument will be discussed and I will reveal some of the difficulties involved in categorising general moral principles (if there are such principles) as logical (analytical/necessary) truths. </description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 17 Dec 2020 14:19:20 +0100</pubDate>
      <lastBuildDate>Thu, 17 Dec 2020 14:19:20 +0100</lastBuildDate>      
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